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Abstract
Several applications require computing distances between different people. For example,
this is required if we want to obtain the close contacts of people in case of and epidemic,
or when restraining orders are imposed by a judge. However, periodically revealing location
might pose a privacy threat to the involved parties. Continuous location data may be used
to infer personal information about the owner, like behaviors, religious beliefs, buying habits,
routines, etc. In this paper, we show that it is possible to calculate distance between two
parties without disclosing their latitude and longitude data. For this purpose, we design a
secure protocol based on the ElGamal cryptosystem and its homomorphic properties. The
proposed protocol allows the calculation of distances while preserving location privacy. The
protocol is analyzed in terms of security and performance. The security analysis shows that
no involved party can learn any information about location.
1 Introduction
The continuous growth of mobile applications has lead to a high number of services which require
information about users’ location. In this context, we find several applications which require
computing distances between two individuals. One example of these applications is in case of an
epidemic, where a central entity may need to control distances within the population. Another
example could be in the case of restraining orders imposed by a judge, where a central entity needs
to verify the distance between a victim and its aggressor.
Even if these services make a real contribution to the community, they can also pose a serious
threaten to users’ privacy. The straightforward way to find the distance between two users requires
that both reveal their actual location. Based on their right of privacy, users might be unwilling to
reveal this information. For this reason, it is necessary to provide alternatives which allow users
to benefit from these location-based services without giving up their privacy.
Encryption is a strong asset to provide data privacy. However, while encryption can secure
data in transit and stored, to put data to use at some point it needs to be decrypted, and in that
moment it becomes vulnerable. However, secure multi-party computation [DIK10] is an area of
cryptography which provides the ability to compute values of interest from multiple encrypted data
sources without any party having to reveal their private data. Secure multi-party protocols are
applied in different areas [Yao82], like secret voting, or database querying. In these scenarios, users
compute the value of a function without unduly giving away any information about the values of
their own variables.
Similarly to secure multi-party computation, we present a cryptographic protocol based on
multiplicative homomorphic encryption. The proposed protocol makes it possible to calculate
distance between two entities without revealing their actual coordinates.
Regarding the distance calculation, we employ the Haversine formula [Sin84]. This formula
determines the great-circle distance between two points on a sphere given their longitudes and
latitudes. Regarding cryptography, we use the ElGamal [ElG85] cryptosystem and its homomorphic
properties.
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2 Contributions and plan of this paper
In this paper, we address the situation where two users need to learn the distance between them,
but do not want to reveal their exact location. For this purpose, we present a cryptographic pro-
tocol based on ElGamal cryptosystem and its homomorphic properties to calculate the Haversine
distance between two points without revealing their GPS coordinates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the background tools used
in our protocol. Section 4 summarizes some literature related to our work. Section 5 describes
the proposed protocol in detail. Sections 6 and 7 analyze the protocol in terms of security and
performance. Finally, Section 8 presents the conclusions of the work.
3 Background
As mentioned before, the designed cryptographic protocol is based on homomorphic properties. In
order to calculate distance, we employ the Haversine formula. In this section, we describe these
components which are later used in the protocol.
3.1 ElGamal cryptosystem
Details and proofs of ElGamal cryptosystem can be found in [ElG85]. However, for the sake of
notation in later sections, we summarize the main operations:
• Key generation
First, a large random prime number p is generated, where p = 2q+1 and q is a prime number
too. Also, a generator g of the multiplicative group Z∗q is chosen. Then, the user generates
a random private secret key s ∈ Z∗q and calculates the public key y = gs.
• Message encryption
Given a message m and a public key y, a random value r is generated and the ciphertext is
computed as follows:
Ey(m) = c = (c1, c2) = (g
r,m · yr). (1)
• Message decryption
A cyphertext Ey(m) = (c1, c2) is decrypted using the private key as follows:
m =
c2
c1s
=
m · yr
gr·s
(2)
3.1.1 Multiplicative homomorphic ElGamal
Homomorphic encryption schemes are used to perform operations on ciphertexts without decrypt-
ing data. When the result of the operation is decrypted, it is the same as if the calculation had
been carried out on raw data.
More precisely, a (group) homomorphic encryption scheme over a group (G, ∗) satisfies that
given two encryptions c1 = Ek(m1) and c2 = Ek(m2), where m1, m2 ∈ G and k is the encryption
key, one can efficiently compute Ek(m1 ∗m2) without decrypting c1 and c2.
ElGamal cryptosystem is a multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme. This means that
the generic operation "∗" described above is the product operation "·".
A proof of the ElGamal cryptosystem homomorphic properties can be found in [LMC16]. Nev-
ertheless, it can be easily seen that, for a public key y, two random numbers r1 and r2, and two
messages m1 and m2:
Ey(m1) ·Ey(m2) = (gr1 ,m1 · yr1) · (gr2 ,m2 · yr2) = (gr1+r2 , (m1 ·m2) · yr1+r2) = Ey(m1 ·m2) (3)
This simply means that performing a product between two ElGamal ciphertexts, we obtain the
encrypted version of their cleartext product. This is a useful property that we will employ in the
proposed protocol.
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3.2 The Haversine formula
The Haversine formula started coming into use in the beginning of the 19th century, for navigation
purposes [Sin84]. This formula gives minimum distance between any two points on a spherical
body by using latitude and longitude. It is a special case of a more general formula in spherical
trigonometry, the law of haversines, that relates the sides and angles of spherical triangles.
Assuming that we want to calculate distance between user 1 located at latitude and longitude
(λ1, ϕ1), and user 2 located at (λ2, ϕ2), the Haversine distance d is:
d = 2R arcsin
(√
sin2
(
λ2 − λ1
2
)
+ cosλ1 cosλ2 sin
2
(
ϕ2 − ϕ1
2
))
(4)
where R is the Earth radius, i.e., the approximate distance from Earth’s center to its surface,
about 6,371 km.
For simplification, the Haversine formula is often expressed as a list of steps:
∆λ = λ2 − λ1
∆ϕ = ϕ2 − ϕ1
a = sin2
(
∆λ
2
)
+ cosλ1 cosλ2 sin
2
(
∆ϕ
2
)
d = 2R atan2
(√
a,
√
1− a)
(5)
where atan2(·, ·) is the 2-argument variant of the arctangent function.
Nevertheless, since we will be using a multiplicative homomorphic ElGamal in our protocol, it
is more convenient to express all the calculations related to λ1, ϕ1, λ2, ϕ2 as products. In order to
do so, we apply the trigonometric conversion for the angle difference identity:
sin(α − β) = sinα cosβ − cosα sinβ (6)
Consequently, we can express the Haversine formula as the following list of steps:
i = cos
(
λ1
2
)
sin
(
λ2
2
)
− sin
(
λ1
2
)
cos
(
λ2
2
)
j = cos
(ϕ1
2
)
sin
(ϕ2
2
)
− sin
(ϕ1
2
)
cos
(ϕ2
2
)
a = i2 + j2 cosλ1 cosλ2
d = 2R atan2
(√
a,
√
1− a)
(7)
Now, by rearranging terms, we can write the following formulae:
i1 =cos
(
λ1
2
)
sin
(
λ2
2
)
i2 =sin
(
λ1
2
)
cos
(
λ2
2
)
j1 =cos
(ϕ1
2
)
sin
(ϕ2
2
)
j2 =sin
(ϕ1
2
)
cos
(ϕ2
2
)
m =cosλ1 cosλ2
a =i21 − 2i1i2 + i22 +mj21 − 2mj1j2 +mj22
(8)
Hence, a can be computed by adding up six terms, each of which can be computed only with
multiplications: a = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 with
t1 =i
2
1
t2 =− 2i1i2
t3 =i
2
2
t4 =mj
2
1
t5 =− 2mj1j2
t6 =mj
2
2
(9)
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Note that, once a is available, the distance d can be directly obtained using the expression for
d detailed in Equation 7. The values of the different terms are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1: Terms for the computation of a
t1 = cos
2
(
λ1
2
)
sin2
(
λ2
2
)
t2 = − 12 sinλ1 sinλ2 t3 = sin2
(
λ1
2
)
cos2
(
λ2
2
)
t4 = m cos
2
(
ϕ1
2
)
sin2
(
ϕ
2
)
t5 = − 12m sinϕ1 sinϕ2 t6 = m sin2
(
ϕ1
2
)
cos2
(
ϕ
2
)
An equivalent expression can be found for the terms of a making use of the following trigono-
metric identity:
cos2 α sin2 β + sin2 α cos2 β =
1
2
− 1
2
cos(2α) cos(2β)
Hence:
t1 + t3 =
1
2
− 1
2
cos
(
2
λ1
2
)
cos
(
2
λ2
2
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
m
and
t4 + t6 =
1
2
m− 1
2
m cos
(
2ϕ1
2
)
cos
(
2
ϕ2
2
)
=
1
2
m− 1
2
m cosϕ1 cosϕ2
Thus, t1 and t3 in Table 1 could be replaced by the following terms:
t˜1 =
1
2
t˜3 = −1
2
m
(10)
Similarly, both t4 and t6 can be replaced by the following terms:
t˜4 =
1
2
m
t˜6 = −1
2
m cosϕ1 cosϕ2
(11)
Finally, there are at least four equivalent ways to divide a in different terms that, added up
together, lead to the same value:
a = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 (12)
a = t˜1 + t2 + t˜3 + t4 + t5 + t6 (13)
a = t1 + t2 + t3 + t˜4 + t5 + t˜6 (14)
a = t˜1 + t2 + t5 + t˜6 (15)
Note that t˜3 and t˜4 cancel each other. Hence, the computation can be reduced to:
a = t˜1 + t2 + t5 + t˜6 =
1
2
+ t2 + t5 + t˜6 (16)
with t2 = − 12 sinλ1 sinλ2, m = cosλ1 cosλ2, t5 = − 12m sinϕ1 sinϕ2 and a˜6 = − 12m cosϕ1 cosϕ2.
To simplify the notation, we refer to three terms a1, a2 and a3 that are required to compute a
with a1 = t2, a2 = t5 and a3 = t˜6. In principle, if P1 and P2 are not very far and their location
angles are relatively similar (at least belonging to the same quadrant), all terms ai will be negative.
4 Related work
Secure Multi-Party Computation, often denoted as MPC, allows a set of users U1, . . . , Un, who
each possess some initial values x1, . . . , xn, to securely compute some function f(x1, . . . , xn) =
(y1, . . . , yn) such that Ui learns nothing but yi.
MPC has been applied in the literature in several fields. For example, voting protocols like
[BJ16, Sha16] need to count votes but maintaining secrecy voting for each user. In a Yes-No voting
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(Y-N), a simplistic solution is to use an additive homomorphic cryptosystem, like Paillier [Pai99].
Each user may encrypt a positive vote as a zero, and a negative vote as a one. Adding all the
encrypted votes and then collaboratively decrypting the outcome, will result into the addition of
all the positive votes.
Another field where MPC is applied is the auctions domain [Cac99, BDJ+06]. In this scenario,
a set of bidders propose a sealed (encrypted) bid. Using secure multi-party computation, and again
homomorphic encryption, it is possible to determine which is the highest bid, without revealing
the amounts proposed by the other bidders.
Benchmarking is another area where MPC can be applied [ABL+04, DDN+16]. In this context,
there are several companies willing to analyze their business, comparing themselves with other
companies in the market. This process has to be done while preserving confidentiality of companies’
private data.
Many of these solutions have been successfully deployed in specific countries. For example,
the work presented in [BCD+09] the authors use MPC for the calculation of prices for the Danish
sugar beet market. In [BLV17], MPC has been used to evaluate gender pay disparities in Boston.
Another example is found in [BJSV15], which builds a tax fraud detection system prototype for
Estonia, based again on MPC.
In the field of location privacy, MPC has been applied in the work presented in [BJJ+14]. The
proposed solution allows a group of users to find their optimal meeting location. The protocol em-
ploys the additive homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99] and the multiplicative
homomorphic properties of ElGamal [ElG85]. However, combining two cryptosystems introduces
an overload in terms of complexity, computation and communication. Their proposal requires group
key generation and storage for each cryptosystem, more encryption and decryption operations and
extra message exchanges between users. Besides, their solution computes euclidean distance based
on cartesian coordinates, less precise in our scenario since the Earth curvature is neglected. Our
proposal outperforms this work by calculating the Haversine distance with GPS coordinates, easily
obtainable from any mobile device. Besides, our proposal computes distances using only ElGamal
cryptosystem, reducing hence the number of keys, complexity and communication.
5 Proposed protocol
The proposed system is now described in higher detail. The steps described in this section are
depicted in Figure 1
We assume that a Control Center C is willing to help calculate the distance between a user
P1 located at (λ1, ϕ1) and another user P2 located at (λ2, ϕ2). We also assume that C has an
ElGamal private/public key pair (s, y), where y = gs, in a multiplicative group Z∗q . The public key
is known by P1 and P2.
5.1 Ciphertext generation
During this phase, P1 and P2 are going to encrypt the values that C will need in order to apply
the Haversine formula and calculate distance. The process is shown in Table 2, and as a result
each of them obtains 5 ciphertexts necessary to calculate distance according to Equation 7.
Table 2: Ciphertext generation process
P1 P2
Party 1 Party 2
1. c1,1 = (g
r1,1 , cosλ1 · yr1,1) c1,2 = (gr1,2 , cosλ2 · yr1,2)
2. c2,1 = (g
r2,1 , sinλ1 · yr2,1) c2,2 = (gr2,2 , sinλ2 · yr2,2)
3. c3,1 = (g
r3,1 , cosϕ1 · yr3,1) c3,2 = (gr3,2 , cosϕ2 · yr3,2)
4. c4,1 = (g
r4,1 , sinϕ1 · yr4,1) c4,2 = (gr4,2 , sinϕ2 · yr4,2)
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Figure 1: Representation of the protocol steps
5.2 Ciphertext products
In this phase, the multiplicative homomorphic properties of ElGamal are going to be used to
prepare data for the Haversine distance calculation.
One of the agents must send his/her four ciphertexts to the other, who will perform the multi-
plications. Without loss of generality, we assume that P2 sends ciphertexts and P1 multiplies, but
it could be the other way around with no consequences. So, at this point, P2 sends c1,2, c2,2, c3,2,
c4,2 and P1 calculates:
E11 = c1,1 · c1,2 = (gr1,1 , cosλ1 · yr1,1) · (gr1,2 , cosλ2 · yr2,2)
= (gr1,1+r2,2 , cosλ1 · cosλ2 · yr1,1+r2,2)
Due to the multiplicative homomorphic properties of ElGamal, multiplying these two cipher-
texts, P1 obtains an encrypted version of cosλ1 · cosλ2. As shown in Equation 7 in line The other
products in the Haversine formula, are also computed by P1:
E22 = c2,1 · c2,2 = (gr2,1+r2,2 , sinλ1 · sinλ2 · yr2,1+r2,2)
E33 = c3,1 · c3,2 = (gr3,1+r3,2 , cosϕ1 · cosϕ2 · yr3,1+r3,2)
E44 = c4,1 · c4,2 = (gr4,1+r4,2 , sinϕ1 · sinϕ2 · yr4,1+r4,2)
Consequently, at the end of this phase, P1 has four ciphertexts (E11, E22, E33, E44 with the
encrypted version of all the products necessary to apply the Haversine formula. Let Eai be the
ciphertext corresponding to ai, then:
1. Ea1 can be obtained by multiplying E22 by −0.5 in the encrypted domain.
2. Ea2 can be obtained by multiplying E11 by E44 and, then, multiplying the result again with
the encrypted version of −0.5.
3. Ea3 can be obtained by multiplying E11 by E33 and, then, multiplying the result again with
the encrypted version of −0.5.
Now, the naïve approach to complete the protocol would be to transfer Eai to C such that
C could decrypt them, add them up yielding a − 0.5, add up 0.5 and, finally, obtaining d using
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Equation 7. However, this approach would imply that C has access to the decrypted form of the
terms ai. From those values, C could try to obtain some information about the location of P1
and P2. Despite there would be more unknowns (λ1, λ2, ϕ1 and ϕ2) than equations (three), some
information might be obtained from these values. Obviously, if C is honest-but-curious, the naïve
approach does not provide the necessary security and privacy requirements.
The following solution is proposed. First, we assume that P1 is the only party sending data to
C. If both P1 and P2 must send data to C, the protocol can be easily modified to allow it. For
simplicity, we assume that both P1 and P2 are equally interested in knowing the distance and P1
will not deviate from the protocol.
The only computation required to obtain the distance d is the sum of all ai. This sum will
provide a− 0.5 and, finally, d. P1 can hide the relevant ciphertexts Eai among a number of other
encrypted values whose sum S is known by P1. Hence, P1 chooses N − 3 random numbers aˆj for
j = 4, . . .N and
S =
N∑
j=4
aˆj ,
and encrypts them yielding Eaˆj for j = 4, . . .N .
If unsigned integers are used in the encrypted domain, the signs must kept in a separate vector
and send to C to complete the computation.
It must be taken into account, a1, a2, a3 can differ in several orders of magnitude from each
other. For this reason, the random numbers should be generated in the appropriate intervals in
order to hide ai among similar values.
Now, P1 has N encrypted values EA = {Ea1 , Ea2 , Ea3 , Eaˆ4 , . . . , EaˆN} that can be randomly
permuted with a permutation function σ, obtaining σ(EA) = E
′
A. Then, E
′
A is sent to C. Upon
receiving, C can decrypt all of them as described in section 3.1, sum them all obtaining a+S−0.5.
Then P1 can subtract S − 0.5 from a+ S − 0.5 obtaining a and, finally, compute d.
The protocol can be easily adapted such that both P1 and P2 receive the same result. Both P1
and P2 can compute a1, a2, a3 in the encrypted domain. P1 can choose the random numbers aˆj
and their corresponding ciphertexts and send them (both as plaintext and ciphertext) to P2, who
can check that the encryption of all aˆj is correct. Both P1 and P2 can sign the numbers EA and
send them to C. Upon receiving of E′A and, after checking the signatures of E
′
A by P1 and P2, C
decrypts E′A, adds them up, and sends the result a+S− 0.5 to both P1 and P2, who can complete
the computation by subtracting S − 0.5 (known to both) and finally obtain the distance d.
6 Security analysis
In this section, the security of the system is analyzed. First of all, the ElGamal cryptosystem is
semantically secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. This means that a dishonest
user cannot know if two different ciphertexts will result into the same cleartext after decryption.
We have three users in our scenario: P1, P2, and C. All ciphertexts are encrypted using C’s
public key. Consequently, only C can decrypt any message.
Considering the role of each user, three situations might threat the system security:
1. P1 wants to learn the location of P2. The only contact P1 has with the location data
of P2 is during the ciphertext products step (Section 5.2). At this point, P1 receives the
ciphertexts c1,2, c2,2, c3,2, c4,2. These ciphertexts contain trigonometric values of the latitude
and longitude of P2. However, since they are encrypted with the C’ s secret key, P1 cannot
decrypt them and obtain any information about P2’s location.
2. P2 wants to learn the location of P1. P2 receives E
′
A from P1, the N − 3 generated
random values in cleartext (aˆj) and the ciphertexts c1,1, c2,1, c3,1, c4,1. First, P2 encrypts
the cleartexts of aˆj and checks that they appear in E
′
A. This is done to ensure that P1 has not
maliciously altered the process. Consequently, P2 knows that three remaining ciphertexts are
Ea1 , Ea2 , Ea3 . However, since these values are encrypted with C’s public key, P2 cannot learn
any information about P1’s latitude and longitude contained within. With the ciphertexts
c1,1, c2,1, c3,1, c4,1, P2 can compute Ea1 , Ea2 , Ea3 also to check
1 that all the values in E′A are
1Note that this step is not really necessary since P1 could also cheat about c1,1, c2,1, c3,1, c4,1. If we omitted
this step, some operations would be saved on P2’s side. However, the protocol is fairer if both P1 and P2 obtain the
same information from each other.
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correct and compute a signature of E′A to be sent to C.
3. C wants to learn the location of P1 or P2. C can decrypt the permuted encrypted values
E′A. However, these ciphertexts contain parts of the terms used in the Haversine formula
mixed with some other rogue similar values. Consequently, C cannot revert the process to
learn the latitude and longitude of P1 or P2.
7 Performance analysis
In order to further analyze the protocol, we have studied the two elements that may have a higher
impact on the performance: the communication and the computation costs.
First of all, we have measured the communication cost based on the message complexity. In
order words, we have counted how many messages a user must send during the protocol. Note
that we consider sending a long message (for example a list of ciphertexts) as only one message.
We do not deal with the fact that the underlying routing protocol might have to split them into
several chunks. Consequently, there are five message transmissions:
• P2 sends the ciphertexts c1,2, c2,2, c3,2, c4,2 to P1.
• P1 sends the N encrypted values E′A, the ciphertexts c1,1, c2,1, c3,1, c4,1, and the random
numbers aˆj (as cleartext) to P2.
• P1 sends the N encrypted values E′A with his/her signature to C.
• P2 checks the values received form P1 and, if they are correct, sends his/her signature of E′A
to C.
• C broadcasts the resulting calculation a+ S − 0.5 to P1 and P2.
Regarding the computation cost, in our protocol this is inherent to cryptographic operations,
specially modular exponentiations. Analyzing the protocol, the total number of exponentiations
is:
• Encryption under ElGamal requires two exponentiations, one for the first part of the ci-
phertext gr, and the other for the second part m · yr. Although these exponentiations are
independent of the message and can be computed ahead of time if need be, for our scenario
we will treat them as if calculated during execution time. Consequently, since P1 and P2
have to generate the four ciphertexts of Table 2, each of them computes 8 exponentiations.
• P1 has to encrypt N − 3 values to hide the relevant ciphertexts. This results into 2(N − 3)
exponentiations. P2 also encrypts the same values to check that E
′
A received from P1 are
correct.
• Regarding the signatures, each ElGamal signature requires one exponentiation. P1 and P2
have to each sign one message, hence they compute one more exponentiation. C has to verify
both signatures, resulting into four exponentiations.
• Decryption under ElGamal only requires one exponentiation. Since C has to decrypt N
ciphertexts, this requires N more exponentiations.
We can assume that the number of exponentiations performed by C is irrelevant, since the
Control Centre must be designed with enough computation power. P1 and P2 may however be
performing their operations on a more restricted device, like an smartphone with GPS location.
The work presented in [CDDT12] analyzes the cost of executing a cryptographic protocol on
a restricted device such a smartphone. For example, for a Samsung Galaxy S2 smartphone with
a Dual-core Exynos 4210 1.2 GHz processor ARM Cortex-A9 with the Android OS, v2.3 (Ginger-
bread), the authors state that an exponentiation takes 42 ms. In order to compare it to a more
modern device, we have performed the same test for a OnePlus 5 smartphone with a Qualcomm R©
SnapdragonTM 835 Octa-core, 10nm, up to 2.45 GHz processor with the OxygenOS based on
AndroidTM Nougat. In this device, an exponentiation takes 0.19 ms.
P1 and P2 have to each compute 8+2(N − 3)+1 = 2N − 3 exponentiations. Consequently, the
computation time depends on the parameterN . For higherN values, users increase C’s uncertainty
but reduce performance. For example, assuming N = 100, each user’s computations take 8.274 s
approximately in the Samsung Galaxy S2 smartphone, and 37.43 ms in the OnePlus 5 smartphone.
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8 Conclusions
With the extended use of mobile devices and applications, there is a growing number of mobile
services which requiere location data. Although users can obtain many benefits of these services,
continuously revealing the exact location to an external entity is a threat for the involved parties.
For this reason, in this paper we propose a secure multi-party protocol which allows to calcu-
late distances between users, but without requesting location disclosure. In our protocol, using
ElGamal cryptosystem and its homomorphic properties, it is not necessary to reveal the latitude
and longitude in order to obtain the distance.
We have analyzed our protocol in terms of security and performance. The security analysis
shows that none of the involved entities can learn any information about the location of the users.
The performance analysis shows that the computation and communication costs are completely
reasonable for an equipment with similar capabilities to a smartphone device.
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